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O

On Heidegger on Education
and Questioning
Babette Babich
Fordham University, New York, NY, USA

Introduction
Discussions of Heidegger and education take a
number of perspectives as thematic foci.
Questioning is key to Heidegger’s thinking from
the start of Being and Time, calling into question
the foundations of what we suppose ourselves to
know. Thus questioning involves a reﬂection on
education, that is: both teaching and learning.
Heidegger himself thematizes education, signiﬁcantly so in the light of the political circumstances
of his 1933 “Rectoral Discourse” as well as, in an
inventive mode which would, as we shall see have
been better had it been identiﬁed as such, as a reconstruction of his postwar reﬂections on the “Art
of Teaching” and, most importantly, What is
Called Thinking? Heidegger‘s reﬂections on
questioning also include a meditation on both
phenomenology and hermeneutics in “The Question Concerning Technology” in which he
famously describes “questioning as the piety of
thought.”

On Heidegger and Education
A number of contributions to Heidegger and education may be found throughout discussions of
Heidegger, not only on education and pedagogy
but also in terms of Heidegger’s speciﬁcally
didactic style. [Consider, quite conspicuously,
Peters (2009) as well as the contributions to Peters
and Allen (2002), Ehrmantraut (2010) as well as
Mayer (1960) as well as Meyer-Drawe (1988) and
Nießeler (1995). On Eugen Fink’s socialhermeneutic theory of education in particular,
see Meyer-Wolters (1992)]. There are approaches
to Heidegger and education that look speciﬁcally
at Heidegger’s reﬂections on technology drawing
implications for newer forms of education, be it
distance learning via and including computermediated/digital education, or else for today’s
interactive museum and science “learning centers” (Standish 1997; Waddington 2005). Still
other considerations of Heidegger and education
are concerned, some positively, some not so positively, with “authenticity.” [See Nießeler (1995),
once again, as well as Brook (2009)].
Many reﬂections on Heidegger and education
begin with a reading of Heidegger’s “Rectoral
Address” [Heidegger (1985); the initial lecture
was originally published as Die Selbstbehauptung
der deutschen Universität Rede, gehalten bei der
feierlichen Übernahme des Rektorats der
Universität Freiburg i Br. am 27. 5, 1933
(1933)], just where Heidegger speciﬁcally highlights the role of the university (à la John Henry
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Cardinal Newman or, indeed, à la Wittgenstein
who also thematizes the university), and some
go on to consider Heidegger’s postwar reﬂections
on the same National Socialist context, while
other approaches review Heidegger’s reﬂections
after his return to university teaching in his
1951–1952 lecture course, What Is Called Thinking? inasmuch as Heidegger there too explicitly
raises questions of education, speciﬁcally
adverting to both teaching and to learning.
But Heidegger’s concern with education is a
broader one than may be indicated by wordsearch-speciﬁc remarks on education alone.
Hence the attention Heidegger pays to learning
as to learning to think and to questioning runs
throughout his work, characterizing his style of
philosophizing. Indeed, Heidegger’s reﬂections
on questioning in Being and Time mark a hermeneutically styled, phenomenological philosophy
in general: hence its value for a speciﬁcally Heideggerian philosophy of education. [See Peters
(2009), Gordon (1998), and Fink (1979) as well
as his (1970) and overall Gallagher (1992)].
Heidegger’s point of departure in Being and
Time is classically instructive, highlighting the
opposition between what we take ourselves to
know, on the one hand, and what knowing ultimately is on the other. In this way, Heidegger’s
introductory quote from Plato’s Sophist meditates
on knowing unknowing: supposing oneself to
know – “For manifestly you have long been
aware of what you mean when you use the expression ‘being’” –which Heidegger conjoins with the
unsettling disquiet of the recognition that one does
not know, “We, however, who used to think we
understood it, have now become perplexed”
(Plato, Sophist (244a)).
This Platonic or Socratic reticence contra the
presumed knowing that is characteristic of the
sophist (by contrast with the philosopher in Plato
in general) already offers an illustration of the
revelation not of facts conﬁdently assumed but
attests to reﬂective breakdown. By contrast with
presumed and long-standing knowledge (“you
have long been aware of what you mean when
you use the expression ‘being’”), and precisely
where one, that is singularized in the second person, plural in this case, anyone who, had not
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thought to question, questioning is prescribed as
needful remedy for us, in the ﬁrst person plural:
“We, however, who used to think we understood
it, have now become perplexed.”
Heidegger’s illustration of the breakdown of
the ready to hand in the case of a tool like a
hammer, defective or broken, or even simply
missing, works as a halt, be it brief or longer
lasting, in a given undertaking with which one
has to do with the (now) problematic hammer. If
we articulate an unspoken algorithm of problematization, the deﬁcit calls the overall project as such
into question. One can ask, must it be done? Now?
What else might serve in place of a hammer?
Where can a hammer be found? Such an array of
reﬂections can in turn remand the project into an
ad hoc stage, using work-arounds and
substitutes – not only a hammer can be a
hammer – or may initiate a stage of still further
“preparation”: anything worth hammering is best
secured with the appropriate hammer for the job.
Philosophy itself is inherently of such a “workaround” character in some cases or else it is more
classically of the preparatory and reﬂective variety. Undertaking to reﬂect on a given theme, we
may ask ourselves what we know, and if we
remember our Plato (as Whitehead once celebrated, we are all so many footnotes to Plato and
as Ricoeur further emphasized, the goal of scholarship is ultimately to be a footnote), it often
transpires not only that we do not know but
much rather, as in the famous case of the son,
Euthyphro, who, supposing himself to know
what piety is, undertakes to bring his own father
to court on the grounds of impiety, or else of
Thrasymachus, who tells Socrates that he,
Thrasymachus, knows justice to be no more than
the interest of the commanding powers that be,
and so on.
The Socratic (Nietzsche would correct us here
and say the Platonic) lesson of knowing our own
unknowing calls on us to reﬂect upon our longstanding and recalcitrant habit of presuming to
know what we do not know.
Thus, again, we recall that Heidegger begins
his Being and Time with the above-quoted citation
from Plato’s Sophist reﬂecting not on piety (like
the Euthyphro) or justice (like the Republic) but
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precisely to raise the question of what we mean by
being. By asking a classically Platonic question,
Heidegger makes a phenomenological move,
simultaneously hermeneutic, reﬂecting on the
reﬂection and so bracketing the assumption with
which he begins. We are to question whether we
know what being is, but to this end, prior reﬂection is required.
Do we know what we are doing when we put
something into question? What is questioning?
What are we doing when we question?
This style of questioning is familiar to us as
characteristic of Heideggerian philosophy. And
just this questioning makes Heidegger essential
reading for anyone reﬂecting on education, that
is: on the nature of teaching and the nature of
learning.
Heidegger routinely recalls us to such a starting
point: as if philosophy were the proper project of
the perpetual beginner. What, he asks us to ask, is
the origin of the work of art? What is metaphysics? What is the relation of being and thinking,
that is, the relation between what is and what is
thought? What is the essence of, that is to say,
what is the nature of, technology? How can we
come to a free relation to it? What is the
uncanniest of the uncanny? What is the danger?
What is a thing? What is called thinking? Do we
think? More subversively still, presuming the
height of what we suppose human thinking to be
to be science, does science itself think?
Here it must be noted that not all readings of
Heidegger attend to the hermeneutic dimension
proper to his phenomenology. Indeed a standing
problem with traditional Anglophone readings of
Heidegger and education, especially given the
above-noted attentions to the Rektoratsrede, etc.,
corresponds to the analytic character of these
readings (importantly, Thomson 2004, but see
also Tubbs 2004 as well as many of the contributions to Peters and Allen (2002), a character
compounded by the fact, shades of the abovenoted Euthyphro parallel (and we will return to
this below), that such analytic approaches not
only take themselves to be superior to other readings but also insist on describing themselves as
“continental” and not, heaven forfend, as “analytic.” The analytic tactic of refusing to be
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described as analytic works (not at all coincidentally) to resolve the analytic-continental divide on
the side (as it were) of the angels: the AngloSaxon, the analytic, today the “dominant” side,
proving its dominance by excluding other
approaches altogether by denouncing them as
“bad” or even mocking them. The institutional
insularity of such a tactic (this is already a done
deal) is less signiﬁcant than the political dimensions of many readings today. For in reading Heidegger on education, it is traditional (and
reasonable enough) to begin as already noted at
the outset where Heidegger himself thematizes
education, just as Michael Peters, likewise, has
very insightfully shown [See Peters introduction
to his co-edited collection 2002]. Yet to begin
with Heidegger’s address as a university administrator under the Nazi regime and to continue
with Heidegger’s postwar appeal to be permitted
to continue to teach [Heidegger 2000; Hodge
2015 might have proﬁtably drawn on some of
the essays in Peters and Allen 2002] and to go
on to reﬂect on his attention to teaching as such in
the context of his return to the university in
1951–1952 [this is the point of departure for and
organizing principle of Peters and Allen (2002),
but for an insightful situating of this approach and
including a useful bibliography including Michael
Bonnet’s contribution, see Peters’ own chapter,
“Introduction: Heidegger, Education, and Modernity,” pp. 1–25] is to read Heidegger under the
sign of Nazism and in the wake of the publication
of the Black Notebooks that is also consequently
under the sign of at least a certain anti-Semitism.
[See not only my essay (Babich 2015a) which
looks at education and the all-too-ontic instaurations of formation, inclusion and exclusion, but
also the several contributions in English, including my own, to Malpas and Farin (2015)]. There
are quite a few problems with this, none of which
are served by a lack of hermeneutics or indeed a
lack of an as yet unattempted Heidegger-speciﬁc
philology.

4

When the Trivium Is No Longer Trivial:
On Things that No Longer Go Without
Saying
From the outset, even with his earliest works,
were this a discussion of history (rather than
questioning), Heidegger reﬂects that what has
transpired in the university is the displacement
of pedagogy. This shift does not merely affect
scholars and teachers – and this has been true for
some time and is becoming ever more serious in a
digital age but also in an age that focuses on the
student as opposed to the teacher [consider
Rançiere’s wonderful return to Jacobin who
taught that one need not be learned at all to teach
at all (Rançiere 1991)], given current culture
where the student but so too the ever and ever
younger scholar, is valued with more grants, more
initiatives, more support, more discussions/
thematizations by contrast with the increasingly
devalued professor [including breaking professorial appointments into several junior positions, at
other times more egregiously so as in the replacement of tenured appointments with adjunct or
time-limited appointments, inevitably reducing
qualiﬁcation]. At the same time, Rançiere’s
celebratedly ignorant schoolmaster is increasingly
more descriptive than prescriptive: newer “profs”
routinely have never (quite) learned what it is they
are supposedly engaged to teach. Some might
argue that today’s enthusiasm for digital humanities as for the ﬂipped classroom or what we may
call the wiki-teaching model betrays a conﬁdence
that sets adjuncts equal to tenured professors, only
given that they might be, as they now are not,
simply better paid: money makes the teacher and
competence correlates to remuneration. Education
works if and only if the result of education is
employment.
These are contemporary concerns, as relevant
for Ivan Illich as they were for Michael Oakeshott.
For Heidegger, already and nearly a century ago,
what is lost is the prerequisite “art” of teaching,
that is: formation, or Bildung as such. Thus,
Heidegger’s concern is not the eons-old plaint of
the older scholar vis-à-vis the young (as if this
complaint were baseless, as it is not [Oakeshott is
useful on reminding of this as is Illich and indeed
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Nietzsche and many others all in addition to Heidegger. I highlight a discussion of Oakeshott in a
discussion of the Harry Potter ﬁlms, speciﬁcally
Professor Severus Snape, Babich (2016)]). Ignoring both practical pressures, and without appealing to popular culture, as I have just done by
referring to Alan Rickman’s Snape, Heidegger
refers to the supposedly classical components of
the trivium, in his application to the rehabilitation
committee that would have permitted him, as it
ultimately did not permit him, to continue teaching after the war, i.e., grammar, dialectic, and
rhetoric, are ordered, each of them, one to the
other.
To quote Valerie Allen’s and Ares D. Axiotis’
reconstruction (less than clearly identiﬁed as a
reconstruction, this essay is presented by the editor of the collection, Heidegger, Education, and
Modernity, and on the publisher’s website as a
‘translation’ of Heidegger’s de-Naziﬁcation
“deposition,” here cited from Allen and Peters
2002 in the context of education, and by way of
what I take to be an analogy to Plato’s reconstruction of Socrates’ ‘defense’): Heidegger is here
supposed to employ the conventionalities of traditional rhetoric. Thus we learn and are to learn:
ﬁrst from grammar which teaches us to speak aright,
then to dialectic, which teaches us to reason aright,
and ﬁnally to rhetoric, which teaches us to speak
and reason well. Trivium, although a singular word,
already points to the multiplicity within — tri-viaum, three roads made into one (Allen/Axiotis 2002,
p. 32)

It is worth noting the ordinarily unadverted to
classical dissonance: in a classical modality, one
departs from convention by conventionally, formulaically, calling attention to this departure – the
Jury may ignore the remarks of the witness – as
Socrates famously does in his own Apology. In the
face of a judicial hearing on Nazi guilt as a university professor, a hearing deciding whether Heidegger would or would not have the right to
continue to teach, that is to say, to be “rehabilitated” after the war (the German text would highlight the play on Habilitation that is entailed),
again, facing a committee empowered to decide
whether to suspend his venia legendi or else to
grant him the right to rejoin the members of the
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university teaching corps, Heidegger in just this
circumstance is presented as spending his time
talking about teaching.
That this would have been a dissonant thing to
do is important to note. For, like Heidegger, every
other professor subjected to this process
[including, with the sole exception of Heidegger,
every other Nazi rector in Freiburg (Babich
2015a)] had supported the Nazi regime and had
taught under its auspices during the war. Almost
all of the other affected rectors, administrators,
and other academics comported themselves in
their own denaziﬁcation hearings by doing all
the conventional things academics do: the very
things Heidegger begins by listing as
recommended to him (he was coached, as his
colleagues were coached: all with good advice).
[Again, I list those academics who succeeded
Heidegger at Freiburg, all of whom were, successively, inevitably yet more involved with the Nazi
regime than was he, and I note their fates after the
war, fates which in most cases led to a straightforward continuation either in university governance
or in research (Babich 2015a). Unlike his fellow
Nazi academics, his co-professors, Heidegger
conspicuously opted not to follow but to depart
from protocol (the authors speaking in
Heidegger’s place use the word Scheideweg, a
term used in 1955 by Dietrich von Hildebrand,
to make Heidegger’s choice plain). As Heidegger
is here imagined as saying and this too follows the
rhetorical tactic of the Apology: “I am admonished
by earnest supporters to seize this occasion publically to recant any offending words and deeds and
to promise to do the same in future lectures and
publications” toward the end of a patent rehabilitation (Allen/Axiotis 2002, p. 29). This odd circumstance, and it has been noted that Plato’s
Socrates offers a parallel instantiation of this sort
of fatally “rhetorical” display, has been detailed
by my own teacher Hans-Georg Gadamer, not
with too much sympathy in his: “Back from
Syracuse” (Gadamer 1989).
Where Socrates undertook to “teach” the jury
who would decide his life (and his death), so too
Heidegger here is supposed as being minded to
instruct his committee (a tone consistent with that
adopted in the 1966 interview with Der Spiegel).
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And like Socrates, that means expectedly (of
course the results of the trial are known in each
case), Heidegger was not successful. As Plato
wrote the Apology (on Socrates’ behalf and it is
owing to this writerly reason that Nietzsche will
speak of the pre-Platonic as opposed to the
pre-Socratic philosophers), the description was
largely ideal. Heidegger’s enactment of a similar
didacticism, written as if on his own account, is no
exemplar for the aspiring academic.
Instructing his questioners on the “art of teaching,” Heidegger is represented as detailing grammar and dialectic, using, that is to say, taking up
the role of logic and of subjection (as he discussed
this in two senses), including the risqué language
that Allen and Axiotis opted to set into
Heidegger’s mouth (as if we might ever be
allowed to forget that he was a farmer woman’s
son) belongs to the conception of the logos
spermatikos [Heidegger is here depicted as speaking of “putting the mare beneath the stallion”
(Allen/Axiotis 2002, p. 29) and so on) (Ibid.,
p. 35; for useful if approximately analytic and
non-Heideggerian discussion of the logos
spermatikos (a term that is not here employed
although what Allen and Ariotis do insert into
their essay surely glosses it), see Nye (1990)],
and goes on to characterize rhetoric, the third in
the series of the trivium, as “the bastard son of
academe” (Allen/Axiotis 2002, p. 35).
The current Black Notebooks scandal brings
this very “bastard son” into the light, not that we
are all that happy to consider it, and a number of
readers have urged that we banish it or at least
bracket it (see for a discussion of these rhetorical
recommendations: Babich 2015b). Still others,
habitually antagonistic to Heidegger, like
Emmanuel Faye and Richard Wolin, and to a
lesser degree, those concerned to reduce the question of the meaning of Being to meaning as such,
like Tom Sheehan, argue that it is less rhetoric as
such than it is Heidegger who must be regarded as
metaphorical bastard: Heidegger is to be
jettisoned, stripped of any rightful claim to teach
philosophy in the academy, let alone instruct us on
education, much less philosophy of education.
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Questioning
Being and Time begins as a book in the way all
monographs begin: we read a cover or title page
and then a table of contents with a structural
outline of themes. Detailed in the table of contents
is a breakdown of the lineaments of the investigation, both promising and didactically useful to the
reader.
An epigraph in Greek is featured on a single
page, afﬁxed as prefatory to the text, complete
with an explanatory gloss. This is further augmented, if we are reading the English translation,
with footnotes adverting to the translators’ troubles with Heidegger’s terminology:
For manifestly you have long been aware of what
you mean when you use the expression ‘being’. We,
however, who used to think we understood it, have
now become perplexed.

Heidegger glosses this in what is already his
characteristic style as we know from the early
writings: he updates the point in its current relevance and he intensiﬁes it: “Do we in our time
have an answer to the question of what we really
mean by the word ‘being’?” Elsewhere I describe
this rhetorical style as cadence, letting fall; intensiﬁcation, heightening or worsening a certain
readerly anticipation; and retrieve, recovering or
reprising an unadverted to meaning or philosophical advance (Babich 1993). Heidegger immediately answers his own cadence by intensifying its
immediate purchase and persistence, do we have
an answer? “Not at all.” Heidegger thus goes on to
vary and thus intensify Plato’s own remark, “it is
ﬁtting that we should raise anew the question of
the meaning of Being. But,” Heidegger asks
again, “are we nowadays even perplexed at our
inability to understand the expression ‘Being’?
Not at all” (BT, [19/1]).
Heidegger thus begins Being and Time with a
question posed to those of us, that would be philosophy in general, then and still today, who are
persuaded that no question need be raised with
regard to being. So regarded, Being and Time is
nothing less than a questioning of a series of
heretofore non-question-worthy questions regarding being. Instructive is Heidegger’s way of

approaching and hence of getting to articulate
and thus to frame this kind of questioning.
We then read INTRODUCTION 1 followed on
the next line by EXPOSITION OF THE QUESTION OF THE MEANING OF BEING and we
move to the ﬁrst section of the ﬁrst part – I: THE
NECESSITY, STRUCTURE, AND PRIORITY
OF THE QUESTION OF BEING – all in majuscule in the English edition, where the ﬁrst paragraph section is plain enough. The project to begin
with declares “} 1. The Necessity of Explicitly
Restating the Question of Being” necessary above
all because “THIS question has today been forgotten” (BT I:1). Indeed, Heidegger goes on, the
question is forgotten with a perfect good conscience. What is more, note the intensiﬁcation,
its oblivion is justiﬁed: there is no question;
there is no need to question; there is, in fact, no
kind of obscurity at all:
On the basis of the Greeks’ initial contributions
towards an Interpretation of Being, a dogma has
been developed which not only declares the question about the meaning of Being to be superﬂuous,
but sanctions its complete neglect (BT 1:1 [21/2])

Here, not unlike the accounts given by Glenn
Most and John Hamilton detailing the ancient
lyric poet, Pindar as not at all (not really) obscure
(and so too or ditto Heraclitus), in today’s very
current university trend in a German context that
is also to be named a “scientiﬁc” trend, “that
which all ancient philosophers found continually
disturbing as something obscure and hidden has
taken on a clarity and self-evidence such that if
anyone continues to ask about it he is charged
with an error of method” (ibid.).
We hide the obscure in plain sight as obvious
and ordinary, that is, as not worth asking about.
But exactly this spells out what will be the project
of Heidegger’s undertaking:
By considering these prejudices, however, we have
made plain not only that the question of Being lacks
an answer, but that the question itself is obscure and
without direction. So if it is to be revived, this
means that we must ﬁrst work out an adequate
way of formulating it (BT 1:1 [24/4])

In this way, Heidegger proceeds in the next
section to reﬂect on the need to illuminate and to
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clarify the “formal structure of the question of
Being” (Cf. BT I:2).
There is a good deal to say about the prelude to
this clariﬁcation just because, as it turns out, the
prelude itself concerns our presuppositions or presumptions. This focus, of course, is the key to
phenomenology. Contra these prior assumptions,
contra the everyday knowledge one supposes oneself to have to begin with, just as Descartes begins
his own Meditations by reﬂecting on things one
takes oneself to know, we ﬁnd our assumptions
hinder the acquisition of founded knowledge.
Husserl likewise deploys the same method: conscientiously setting aside, or bracketing, “prejudices” (as Heidegger and, later, as Gadamer will
speak of them) for the sake of knowledge but also
for the sake of any possible epistemology.
It is not ignorance, non-knowing, nescience
that stands in the way of knowledge for philosophy. Thus Nietzsche ironically, provocatively
emphasizes the origin of logic in illogic, that is,
as he argues (the point is a critical one for
Nietzsche) (Babich 2014), philosophers and educators alike assume the development of knowledge, or the constructive creation of knowledge,
on the ground of learned ignorance.
We need to acknowledge our non-knowing,
our ignorance. Where one already has knowledge,
one does not undertake, just because one need not
undertake, to seek knowledge. What one takes
oneself to know stands in the way of learning as
it also stands in the way of questioning as such.
When we “already” know, when the answer is
given, questioning can only be supererogatory:
unneeded, or pointless.
Contra presumptive knowledge, convinced as
we are by our “convictions,” to use Nietzsche’s
term, Heidegger “formulates” nothing less obvious than the question of his project as a question.
Thus Heidegger offers a preliminary hermeneutic
phenomenology of what “belongs to any question
whatsoever” (BT I:2), in order to make “the question of Being” manifest in “its own distinctive
character” (ibid.).
Heidegger continues in this second section to
articulate a phenomenology of questioning and
because this phenomenology details a reﬂection
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on questioning, the phenomenological method is
essentially hermeneutic:
Every inquiry is a seeking [Suchen]. Every seeking
gets guided beforehand by what is sought. Inquiry is
a cognizant seeking for an entity both with regard to
the fact t h a t it is and with regard to its Being as it is
(BT I:2)

Questioning is fundamentally intentional, most
evidently when one reﬂects on questioning. For
Heidegger, a “cognizant seeking” may be framed
as an investigation: questioning “can take the
form of ‘investigating’ [‘Untersuchen’], in
which one lays bare that which the question is
about and ascertains its character” (BT I:2). In
this sense, every questioning is also always (and
already) a phenomenological reﬂection, directed
to itself and raising a speciﬁcally hermeneutic
question. This is what Heidegger calls, qua
“inquiry about something,” that express directedness to “that which is asked about [sein
Gefragtes]” (BT I:2). And even here further
reﬂection is signiﬁcant because “all inquiry
about something is somehow a questioning of
something [Anfragen bei. . .]” (BT I:2).
In other words, one does not question in an
arbitrary fashion but with intentional speciﬁcity
concerning what is asked about, even when, especially when, the question is empty or pro forma. In
addition to what is thus thereby queried, an
inquiry has that to which the questioning is
directed: “that which is interrogated [ein
Befragtes]” (BT I:2). Already “formal indication”
is at work and Heidegger explains “speciﬁcally
theoretical” questions of investigation, be they
speciﬁcally philosophical or scientiﬁc, or, just
for the instructive sake of an example, in terms
of police work, as represented in popular crime
ﬁction as “detective work”. Here the example of
the detective can be useful for understanding
Heidegger’s questioning in a way that lays bare
both its pedagogic value in practice and its theoretical contribution to the philosophy of
education.
It is already the speciﬁcity of questioning that
“determines” and conceptualizes what is asked
about. “Furthermore,” Heidegger goes on to say,
“in what is asked about there lies also that which is
to be found out by the asking [das Erfragte]”
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(BT I:2).The question articulated already delimits
as such or outlines the answer sought. HansGeorg Gadamer will emphasize this as the dialectical, dialogical character of hermeneutics. Here
the example of the detective is appropriate as an
investigation seeking “what is really intended”
(ibid.). Once one ﬁnds this that is “really
intended” in the case of a murder mystery, one
has uncovered the intended “goal.” One knows, in
questioning suspects and eliminating possible
alternatives, the answer to the mystery of the
question of the “who” (who committed the murder?), and therewith, also, one knows, and this in
advance, some part of the why question and some
part of the how of it.
A hermeneutic phenomenology of questioning
is useful in a further, more properly reﬂexive
fashion. As Heidegger underlines, the investigator
is not a neutrally objective subject or “immaculate
perceiver” to use Nietzsche’s language. Much
rather: “Inquiry itself is the behaviour of a questioner, and therefore of an entity, and as such has
its own character of Being” (BT I:2 [24/5]).
Hence, if we keep to the murder mystery or detective instantiation of questioning, the literary (and
in the interim also ﬁlmic and television) personage of Hercule Poirot goes about his inquiry differently than does (the variety of acteurly types
exemplifying) Sherlock Holmes or else Agatha
Christie’s heroines, be it on the page or on the
screen, and so too television’s Peter Falk with his
Socrates-like Detective Columbo by contrast, say,
with Basil Rathbone’s or Benedict Cumberbatch’s
Sherlock Holmes. Thus Heidegger, himself
almost anticipating Falk’s Columbo, easy given
philosophy’s paradigm investigator in the person
of Socrates and his style of questioning, as we
may recall this style in either the Euthyphro or
the more educationally reﬂective Meno, reﬂects
thematically that “When one makes an inquiry
one may do so ‘just casually’ or one may formulate the question explicitly” (Ibid.). In either case,
the fashion in which one frames the question as a
particular questioner will make a difference.
What matters is both the logical framing that is
the question and the very pre-given orientation
toward what is sought that is also entailed in and
by and through the question. This means that the

On Heidegger on Education and Questioning

question is indispensable in every way, and reﬂection on the question as such is not a merely formal
reﬂection but exactly hermeneutico-phenomenologically essential: Here we pay attention in the
following quote to the exigent character attributed
to what must be:
Inquiry, as a kind of seeking, must be guided
beforehand by what is sought. So the meaning of
Being must already be available to us in some way
(BT I:2 [25/5])

Heidegger, we recall, began by framing this
point as not speciﬁc to the Being question as
such but as holding generically for all questions,
formally: “Every seeking gets guided beforehand
by what is sought” (BT 1:2 [24/5]).

Ask and It Shall be Given, Seek and Ye
Shall Find
It is the ‘Being question” which permits us to
unpack the character of questioning:
We do not know what ‘Being’ means. But even if
we ask, “What is ‘Being’?”, we keep within an
understanding of the ‘is’, though we are unable to
ﬁx conceptionally what that is’ signiﬁes. We do not
even know the horizon in terms of which that meaning is to be grasped and ﬁxed. But this vague average understanding of Being is still a Fact (BT I:2
[25/6])

In other words, the Being question, what is is,
presupposes an understanding of what is is. That
is, and this is also the logical question of reference, as of indication, as of signiﬁcation, we need
to know in some way (even prethetically as Heidegger will say) what we are talking about just in
order to pose a question about it. And this is most
particularly so in the case of the supposedly vague
and general and for these reasons typically taken
to be needless or pointless question of Being, just
because the theme itself is being, i.e., is isness,
what it is for something to be, that is, for it to be
said of anything that it is. “What we seek when we
inquire into Being is not something entirely unfamiliar, even if proximally, we cannot grasp it at
all” (Ibid.).
The difference here with respect to Being is
that we are not reﬂecting on the “origin” of a
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thing, whether in particular or in general. At issue
then is not a question of genesis or genealogy,
birth or mythology, i.e., “telling a story” to use
Heidegger’s language as he puts it, just to the
extent that Being, of which we speak, Heidegger’s
Sein, and about which we seek to inquire, is not an
entity or particular being and hence cannot be
explicated as entities can be, that is, “by tracing
them back in their origin to some other entities”
(Ibid.). Rather as Heidegger explains:
Since Being is asked about, and since beings are
constituted in their Being, all the conditions of
questioning as articulated in this section turn out
to be available. In so far as Being constitutes what is
asked about, and “Being” means the Being of entities, then entities themselves turn out to be what is
interrogated. These are, so to speak, questioned as
regards their Being (BT 1:2 [26/6])

Paraphrasing Brentano on Aristotle, Heidegger
reﬂects that “there are many things which we
designate as ‘being’ [‘seiend’], and we do so in
various senses” (BT 1:2 [26/7]). Key to this overall involvement and to this very multiplicity, the
questioning itself is also included as a reﬂection
on Being, still more critically, as a reﬂection on
the inquirer as well: we, ourselves, are as questioners to be implicated. Thus we are also to be put
in question. This last point is decisive as the
questioner turns out in this case to be quite singular, just given the inquirer’s preoccupation both
with him- or herself, reﬂexively and existentially,
concerned, as Heidegger will explore this concern, with the very real and immediate question
of its own being as such. Thus Heidegger logically
locates Dasein in terms of questioning and with
respect to the Being question as such:
to work out the question of Being adequately, we
must make an entity — the inquirer — transparent
in his own Being. The very asking of this question is
an entity’s mode of Being; and as such it gets its
essential character from what is inquired about —
namely, Being. This entity which each of us is
himself and which includes inquiring as one of the
possibilities of its Being, we shall denote by the
term “Dasein” (BT 1:2 [26/6])

If it is clear that this is as such speciﬁc to the
kind of question that constitutes the so-called
Being question, it ameliorates what can appear
to be a kind of circularity. Heidegger thus pays
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attention to what he calls the “clue” of “the formal
structure of the question as such,” noting that “we
made it clear that this question is a peculiar one, in
that a series of fundamental considerations is
required for working it out, not to mention for
solving it” (BT 1:3 [28/8]).
Heidegger does not raise the question of
questioning in order merely to frame the thematic
of Being as such or even Dasein. Rather he is and
remains concerned with exploring the notion of
the question as such, as a question: noting that the
“distinctive features” of the Being question as a
question can only be illuminated fully once we
“we have delimited it adequately with regard to its
function, its aim, and its motives” (Ibid.).
Perhaps the most signiﬁcant point then in
Heidegger’s sustained reﬂections in Being and
Time and elsewhere is the difﬁculty of setting
oneself on the path of actual inquiry. In other
words, questioning as such, really questioning,
turns out to be elusive. The problem, as Heidegger
also writes in his What is Metaphysics?, coincides
with authenticity, owning the question as one’s
own question and as such. That is the challenge
of actually posing, framing, engaging, and putting
the question as such, in other words: really
questioning.
After reﬂecting on this challenge as his point of
departure in What is Called Thinking?, Heidegger
emphasizes that what is most thought-provoking
of all is that we continue to fail to think: we are
(still) not thinking. The point bears on the project
of education. One can imagine Heidegger meant
this statement to be heard in context, in this particular lecture course, as a vindication of his return
to the university and in the wake of his failed
efforts to impress the denaziﬁcation committee
that had instead withdrawn his venia legendi.
For Heidegger, once restored to his university
post, speaking to his students as they set out on
what he tells them will be required of them in
order to follow the path of those who mean to
“learn to think” (Heidegger 1976), what must for
Heidegger be underscored contrasts bridges, speciﬁcally, what must be presupposed to build and to
use bridges, with what must similarly be
presupposed for the sake of the leap. The metaphor is replete with references to the (very
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parodic) challenges of Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke
Zarathustra and Nietzsche’s Übermensch
(or overhuman). [I discuss this in a number of
places; see most recently Babich (2013)]. For
Heidegger, there can be no bridge and thus he
underscores the necessity of the leap, to be distinguished from the “makeshift ties and asses’ bridges by which humanity today would set up a
comfortable commerce between thinking and the
sciences” [Heidegger, What is Called Thinking?,
p. 8].
With the example of the leap, Heidegger
emphasizes that we can learn “only if we always
unlearn at the same time” (Heidegger, What is
Called Thinking?, p. 8). That same unlearning
entails the need to let go. This is a kind of
Gelassenheit – letting be or releasing what we
think we know. [I explore some of the complexities of this notion using an aesthetic metaphoricity
in Babich (2015c)]. The enemy of thinking, the
enemy of learning, is nothing other than our original formation: what we have learned. Heidegger
thus invites his listeners in his ﬁrst lecture course
given upon his return to teaching at the university
to “radically unlearn what thinking has been traditionally” [Heidegger, What is Called Thinking?,
p. 8]. And to that end, there is nothing but that
same releasement that would “allow ourselves to
become involved in questions that seek what no
inventiveness can ﬁnd” [Heidegger, What is
Called Thinking?, p. 8].
Here Heidegger reﬂects – and just this is often
quoted in essays on Heidegger and
education – that “Teaching is even more difﬁcult
than learning” (Heidegger 1976, p. 15). The
“even” in this articulation is to be foregrounded
inasmuch as what is at issue in teaching is above
all a letting learn. Just such a “solicitude” (as we
remember the elusive because very compact discussion of solicitude [Fürsorge] in Being and
Time) (Babich 2015d) is “difﬁcult” precisely
because “the real teacher lets nothing else be
learned than – learning” (Heidegger 1976,
p. 15). The teacher has to be more teachable than
the one who learns, and at the same time, the
teacher has to be able to allow the student to
learn, whereby Heidegger offers his own version
of Nietzsche’s Zarathustran remonstration: one
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repays a teacher badly if one remains a student
or a follower much less an acolyte, reﬂecting that
the teacher has, just in order to be a teacher, to
withdraw as such: like the pointer that Heidegger
had already noted as part of the human condition
of adverting to what is revealed as it obscures
itself, as it withdraws. So too the teacher’s comportment “often produces the impression that we
properly learn nothing from him” (Heidegger
1976, p. 15). Said otherwise: a teacher to be a
teacher must get out of the way. But what this
means is not that the teacher is not important but
that we do not know our teachers. As Nietzsche
would say, we do not recognize them. This is
ineluctable and it means that our true teachers,
“true” as Nietzsche would say, are not honored
with teaching awards: like Schopenhauer, as compared with Hegel or Wilhelm von Humboldt, they
are not singled out as the great men and women of
our educational institutions. Indeed, they are not
likely to be known as such. The withdrawal in
question for Heidegger, who prefers to speak of
reticence, is not a matter of the initially noted
focus on the student (as opposed to the professor),
on the young (as opposed to the old). The
teacher’s withdrawal is not for the sake of support,
that would be a kind of unsettling Fürsorge, that is
a disrupting leaping-in for or on behalf of the
other, no matter how well-intended the mentorship or how positive the encouragement (although
this is certainly how many teachers institute their
own successors). Much rather and by contrast, for
Heidegger, what is incumbent on the teacher as
teacher is letting learn. That means the teacher has
to free the learner for his or her ownmost possibilities of and in being, including one’s ownmost
projects, concerns, challenges, and limitations.
What is here at stake is Being as such.
Just as “the sign stays without interpretation,”
as Heidegger writes just before he turns to reﬂect
on Hölderlin’s Mnemosyne, the human being himself (or herself and this should always be said
when we are speaking of Heidegger’s or of
Hölderlin’s human being) is a sign, an indication
pointing toward what is already withdrawn,
revealed, and obscured, in eclipse. “We,” he
repeats this, “are a sign that is not read”
(Heidegger 1976, p. 18).

On Heidegger on Education and Questioning

“We are trying to learn thinking” (Heidegger
1976, p. 16), so Heidegger teaches. What is Called
Thinking? is a class, speciﬁcally: a written set of
lectures for a class, and, exactly par for the course,
he begins Lecture I of Part Two by reprising his
reﬂection on the question: “What is it to which we
give the name thinking?” (Heidegger 1976,
p. 113). In the case of science, the investigation
seeks to frame the query in a characteristic way,
speciﬁc to the regional speciﬁcity of the science in
question, and Heidegger also speaks of this more
generally in terms of the age of “world picture.”
[I am of course referring to Heidegger’s essay of
the same name, but it is also part of his reﬂections
in Being and Time: “Scientiﬁc research accomplishes, roughly and naively, the demarcation
and initial ﬁxing of the areas of subject-matter.
The basic structures of any such area have already
been worked out after a fashion in our
pre-scientiﬁc ways of experiencing and
interpreting that domain of Being in which the
area of subject-matter is itself conﬁned” [BT 1:3,
29/9)]. The scientist is interested in a certain representation of the world, and, as Heidegger also
points out, the modern, technologically advanced
scientist is interested rather less in attaining a
theoretical understanding of a speciﬁc subject
ﬁeld than in being able to challenge forth nature
productively in a speciﬁc, experimental, instrumentally calculable way. In part, this is all about
the kind of query speciﬁc to science which, as
Immanuel Kant had already pointed out in his
own phenomenological reﬂection on the method
of scientiﬁc understanding, follows a very speciﬁc
questioning tack: by setting speciﬁc questions that
nature is compelled to answer, instrumentally
articulated. This is the experimental project of
science, not an objective or neutral undertaking
and often quite violent, sometimes, in the case of
animal research, a very bloody, fatal matter of
interrogative compulsion and torture. But by this
kind of questioning, one ﬁnds, this is the specialized nature of modern science, just and only the
answers one wishes.
Here, a phenomenological hermeneutics is
invaluable as one can recognize that the kind of
inquiry thereby scientiﬁcally deployed is exactly
non-neutral, utterly subjective: one challenges
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forth toward quite speciﬁc ends not only of explanation but for the sake of technologizable prediction and, ultimately, for the sake of calculatively
speciﬁc and indeed manufacturable control. What
one has thereby is a techno-scientiﬁc picture of the
world just to the extent that the means, the how,
and the whereby and the ways of this interrogation
will always be part of the scientiﬁc image
presented. This eliminates the innocent idea of
simply going up to nature, as it were, and ﬁguratively, in the case of science, asking neutral or
objective questions. For Heidegger by contrast,
to return to the question of questioning, we note
the relevance of what he calls, at the conclusion of
his Question Concerning Technology, “the piety
of thought” (Heidegger 1977, p. 35).
We only can ask after the means of our interrogation in the case of science (and in the case of
the technology that we use to advance science), if
we mean to question in such a way that we call our
own presuppositions into question. In other
words, we take ourselves to know in the case of
modern, i.e., scientiﬁc, technology that we know
what technology is (an instrument or a tool, a
human undertaking or preoccupation); our presumption is that technology in its essence is
already available to us in advance of any
questioning after it. Here, we may now recall,
this conviction stymies inquiry, getting in the
way of any kind of questioning, superﬁcial or
genuine/authentic: why ask where we already
know? In the case of technology, the problem is
and remains that we seek to control technology.
But where we do not see the problem, where we
already know what technology is (it’s a tool, it’s a
means: it’s neutral, it’s fundamentally human),
control remains elusive. Heidegger later suggests
in his lecture celebrating the local Messkirch composer, Conradin Kreutzer and published as
Gelassenheit, what he had already pointed out in
the Question Concerning Technology, namely, it
is enough, if it is also hard enough, to reﬂect on
what is needed to gain a “free relation” to technology as part of any philosophical inquiry that
would ask after the nature of the essence of technology as of anything in particular.
A determination is already at work when we
put the object of inquiry into question in a speciﬁc
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way, for a speciﬁc purpose, and in terms of a given
disciplinary project or undertaking. We ask philosophical questions as we ask scientiﬁc questions,
economic questions, political questions, religious
questions, and spiritual questions, and we also ask
idle questions and in no case are these questions
themselves
unspeciﬁed
even
in
their
non-speciﬁcity but require further reﬂection or
thinking. As Heidegger says in The Question
Concerning Technology, questioning is anything
but nondirective: questioning is utterly intentional. Questioning is the phenomenological
epoché articulated in a sentence: “questioning
builds a way” (Heidegger 1977, p. 3).
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